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1. Introduction 
Leviathan-type governments without constitutional constraints impose taxes at a 
rate that maximizes the tax revenue. This rate is higher than the rate that 
maximizes social welfare in the standard framework wherein social welfare 
depends on useful public goods but not on wasteful spending or rent. It is widely 
known that a strong constraint can be set by the constitution to limit the tax rate. 
However, other constraints are required when constitutional constraints are not 
available. Plausible candidates include competition among governments (as an exit) 
and pressure by voters (as a voice). 
Institutional competition among governments may take the form of an 
“exit” such as tax competition, which is popular in theory and practice.1 Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980), among others, showed that because of institutional 
competition among governments, revenue-seeking governments in a federation will 
end up on the upward-sloping part of the Laffer curve. On the contrary, Apolte 
(2001) indicated that such a taming effect can only be expected if a certain rule of 
competition among several decentralized governments is applied. He suggested that 
federalism is not necessarily a substitute for constitutional limits to Leviathans. 
In addition to institutional competition, it is important to examine the role 
of political pressure by general voters because the amount of rent seeking is usually 
affected by the voters’ “voice,” as pointed out by Hoyt (1999).2 See also 
Cheikobossian (2008), Edwards and Keen (1999), and Besley and Smart (2007). 
Suppose that there are two types of public spending: wasteful spending and 
useful spending. A rent-seeking government would prefer to increase the share of 
wasteful spending by conducting its political activities. On the other hand, the 
voters also have an incentive to perform their political activities or make efforts to 
reduce the share of wasteful spending and increase that of useful spending. The 
actual distribution of tax revenue between useful and wasteful spending is 
determined as the outcome of political contests between the rent-seeking 
government and the voters. 
In this paper, we consider a simple formulation of a political contest. In our 
approach, the rent-seeking politicians and the general voters engage in a political 
contest in terms of resources. The greater the amount of political effort by the voters 
(rent seekers), the greater is the share of useful spending (wasteful spending) at the   3
given level of total tax revenue. This political contest can result in a compromise. In 
reality, voters make some political efforts to influence budgetary outcomes through 
voting, writing articles, lobbies, and protests, while politicians make such efforts 
through campaigns, logrolling, bribery, and corruption. 
Buchanan (1980) suggested a property right perspective on rent seeking 
wherein rent-seeking activities may be viewed as attempts to redefine property 
rights. Our political contest model adopts this approach. More specifically, the 
voters may have property rights over the tax revenue collected nominally. However, 
these rights are not secure, since they can be altered or reallocated as a result of 
theft or rent seeking by the politicians. Offense creates a demand for defense, and 
hence, as first pointed out by Wenders (1987), rent seeking self-generates rent 
defending. Instead of remaining idle and awaiting the outcome of politicians’ rent 
seeking, the voters may intend to protest against such activities. As a parallel to 
campaigns, logrolling, bribery, and corruption by politicians aiming to exploit 
budgetary rents, voting, writing articles, lobbies, and protests by voters against 
exploitation by politicians can be observed in the real world. 
A natural conjecture about the outcome of a political contest is that the 
equilibrium tax rate will be set on the upward slope of the Laffer curve since the 
political effort by general voters imposes some degree of political constraints on 
rent-seeking behavior. Contrary to this conjecture, we show that the rent-seeking 
politicians may intend to set the tax rate higher than the revenue-maximizing rate. 
This is mainly because an increase in the tax rate will engender a negative income 
effect on the political efforts of voters. 
The inclusion of a political contest leads to two main effects if the tax rate is 
raised. First, the corresponding increase in the tax revenue, if any, will stimulate 
both the rent-seeking behavior of politicians and the rent-reducing behavior of 
voters in the political contest. However, this tax revenue effect is nil at the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate because the tax revenue will not marginally change at 
this rate. Second, an increase in the tax rate at the revenue-maximizing point will 
undermine the political efforts of voters by reducing their disposable income. This 
negative income effect is beneficial to the rent seeker in the political contest as it, 
other things being equal, raises the relative share of tax revenue allocated to 
him/her. The second effect dominates the first effect at the top of the Laffer curve,   4
thereby leading to the Laffer paradox. The main message conveyed by our paper is 
that the “voice” of the general public may not be as effective as competition among 
governments at curbing politicians’ rent seeking. 
We also consider an extended model in which politicians exhibit neither 
completely self-interested nor completely benevolent behavior. We show that if the 
degree of a politician’s rent seeking is not very high, the Laffer paradox does not 
occur. It occurs only if the degree of politicians’ rent seeking exceeds some threshold. 
Shughart II and Tollison (1991) and Wrede (1996, 1999), among others, 
showed that in the case of tax source sharing, revenue-seeking governments in a 
federation will end up on the downward-sloping part of the Laffer curve.3 In the 
present framework, we assume away tax source sharing but incorporate the cost of 
obtaining rent. Interestingly, politicians still intend to set the tax rate at a level 
higher than the revenue-maximizing rate.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
analytical framework. Section 3 considers the political contest model where the 
politician is a rent seeker, while Section 4 examines a more general version of the 
model in which the politician maximizes the weighted sum of his/her rent and the 
welfare of voters. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Basic model 
2.1. Analytical framework 
We develop a simple budgetary model in which the rent-seeking politicians (RPs) 
and the general voters (VTs) interact in a small open economy. 
The government not only provides useful public goods G but also engages in 
wasteful spending S. Public good G is beneficial to the voters, whereas wasteful 
spending S is beneficial to the rent-seeking politicians. Following the tradition of 
Leviathan models of government, as in Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and others, 
politicians prefer wasteful public spending (S), which provides them with 
opportunities to enhance their personal welfare. 
The relative price of public and private goods is set to unity for simplicity. 
Let  τ   denote the tax rate, Y, the total income, and  Y τ , the total tax revenue. The 
government budget constraint is given as follows:   5
  GS Y τ +=
)
,         ( 1 )  
where  S
)
 denotes the gross wasteful spending or gross rent of RP. With regard to 
the budget constraint of politicians, we have 
  SSa =+
)
,         ( 2 )  
where S represents the net wasteful spending or net rent of RP, and a political 
spending or efforts by RP. The objective of the representative RP is to maximize S.  
On the other hand, the social welfare, W, which reflects VT’s preferences 
over public goods G and private consumption c, is given by 
  W =  () ( ) uG hc + ,        ( 3 )  
where  ) (G u  denotes utility from public consumption G, with  0 > ′ u  and  0 u′′ < , 
and  () hc   refers to utility from private consumption c with  0 > ′ h  and  0 h′′ < .  
VTs are consumers and investors in the economic sphere. They engage in 
private investment k, which has the productive effect of raising income, and thereby, 
tax revenue. Moreover, k may be regarded as the various efforts made to increase 
private income, such as physical investment, human investment, or labor supply. 
We assume that Y is dependent on private investment by the private sector with 
() () Yf k n f k == ∑ , where  f  is the per capita income and n is the number of 
general voters. The function  f is assumed to satisfy the standard condition:  ' f  > 
0, and  " f  < 0. Henceforth, we assume n = 1 for simplicity; this implies that the 
free-rider problem does not exist among VTs, which provides them with the best 
scenario for dealing with RPs. However, the main result of our paper will 
qualitatively hold even if we allow for the case wherein n > 1 (see Section 3.4).   
VTs also make political efforts e. These political efforts may be direct, for 
example, through voting in referendums such as the passage of Proposition 13,4 or 
indirect, for example, through donating money to organized groups such as the 
National Taxpayer Union.5 The budget constraint of each voter is given as 
  (1 ) ( ) cek f k τ ++= − .        ( 4 )  
For simplicity, investment is assumed to produce output instantaneously. Therefore, 
we may use the static model. 
 
2.2. Pure rent-seeking model   6
We first consider the pure rent-seeking model as a benchmark. Without any 
political contest, a = e = 0 and G = 0. RP is assumed to maximize S simply by 
choosing  τ . The timing of the game is as follows. First, RP chooses  τ  to  maximize 
S. Then, VT determines k and c. 
  The first-order condition with respect to k for VT is 
  (1 ) '( ) 1 fk τ −= .         ( 5 )  
VT’s responses to  τ   can be summarized by the functions 
  () kk τ =  and 
  () cc τ = . 
It is clear that the total tax revenue,  Y τ , also becomes a function of  τ . 
The optimal condition with respect to  τ   for RP is given as 
 




= =   0 .         ( 6 )  
Since the total tax revenue is used solely for rent (or wasteful spending), it is 
optimal for RP to choose the tax rate that maximizes the total tax revenue. We 
denote the revenue-maximizing tax rate by  M τ . 
 
2.3. Pure benevolent model 
We consider the pure benevolent model as the other benchmark. A benevolent RP 
chooses G and  τ  to  maximize 
  () [ ( 1 ) ] Wu Gh fk τ =+ − − .  
The timing of the game is as follows. First, RP chooses G and τ  to maximize W. 
Then, VT chooses k to maximize W at the given G and  τ . 
In the second stage of the game, the first-order condition with respect to k is 
the same as that in Section 2.2; that is, 
  (1 ) ' 1 f τ −= .         ( 5 )  
As a result, VT’s response functions for k and c are the same as those in Section 2.2.   
In the first stage of the game, the first-order condition with respect to τ  
(and hence G) is 
  '' [ ( 1 ) ' 1 ] ' 0






=+ − − − = .    (7) 
The second term reduces to zero owing to the first-order condition with respect to k; 
that is, equation (5). The third term represents the (negative) income effect of 






>  since  '0 hf> . 
In other words, the optimal tax rate set by the benevolent RP is less than the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate,  M τ . This is the standard result since the benevolent 
RP considers the marginal cost (negative income effect) of raising τ on private 
consumption c as well as the marginal benefit from raising τ on the provision of 
public good G. 
 
3. Political contest approach 
Section 2 considers two extreme governments, namely, pure rent seeking and pure 
benevolent. These two extremes correspond to two broad types of governments that 
are based on the doctrine of self-interest and the doctrine of the common good 
respectively. In both the models, RP is only allowed to choose tax rate  τ , and VT is 
only allowed to choose investment k. In particular, RP’s rent seeking is constrained 
only by his/her ability to extract tax revenues from VT through taxation. However, 
it is obvious that VT makes political efforts to influence budgetary outcomes 
through voting, writing articles, lobbies, and protests. Likewise, it is obvious that 
RP makes such efforts through campaigns, logrolling, bribery, and corruption. 
We now incorporate political efforts by RP and VT into the pure model. The 
timing of the game is as follows: 
Stage I: RP determines the tax rate and his/her political effort. 
Stage II: VT decides his/her investment, private consumption, and his/her political 
effort. 
Stage III: The political contest determines the actual distribution of tax revenue 
between useful and wasteful projects. 
This formulation is a natural extension of the pure rent-seeking model 
(Section 2.3) and the pure benevolent model (Section 2.4) wherein RP is allowed to 
choose  a apart from tax rate τ , while VT is allowed to choose e apart from 
investment k. The variable a represents RP’s political efforts to seek rents from the 
government budget, while the variable e represents VT’s political efforts to oppose 
RP’s rent seeking. 
 
3.1. Stage III 
RP’s political efforts to exploit budget rents and VT’s political efforts to oppose RP’s   8
exploitation trigger a conflict or contest between RP and VT. The conflict/contest 
involved is presumably complicated, but a key factor used to determine the “output” 
of the conflict/contest is the “inputs” expended by players. Following the seminal 
work of Tullock (1980) and the ensuing literature,6 we adopt the “production 
function” approach to the conflict/contest and assume that the outcome of the 
political conflict/contest is a function of the relative share of the political spending of 
players. Specifically, RP’s gross gain  S
)






= ˆ ,         ( 8 - 1 )  







.         ( 8 - 2 )  
The outcome of the political conflict/contest between RP and VT is summarized by 
contest success functions (8-1) and (8-2).7 These functions show that an increase in a 
at the given e results in an increased distribution of the “pie”  Y τ   in favor of RP but 
against VT and vice versa. Moreover, the functions exhibit the property of 
homogeneity of degree zero such that the same proportional increase or decrease in 
a and e leaves the conflict/contest outcome unchanged.8 
The contest success function usually yields the probability of winning or 
losing. This formulation may then be justified if both RP and VT are concerned with 
the expected division of tax revenue. Alternatively, following Long and Vousden 
(1987) and others, the contest success function may be given a non-probabilistic 
interpretation: players expend resources competing for a share of divisible rent 
rather than the entire indivisible rent, and therefore, the relative share of tax 
revenue is allocated according to the relative share of players’ political efforts. 






.         ( 8 - 1 ) '  
Thus, RP’s net gain or rent S is given by the difference between  S
)
 and a. If a = 0, 
then  S
)
 =  S = 0 according to (8-1) and (8-1)'. 
Moreover, note that an increase in e reduces c at a given level of k. The gain 
in G for VT is at the expense of private consumption. The central trade-off faced by 
agents in the conflict literature is between producing goods and exploiting what   9
others have produced (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2006). The main trade-off faced by 
VT in our model is between investments for producing goods, which can be used in 
the private or public sector, and protests against RP’s rent seeking in the public 
sector. 
 
3.2. Stage II 
Next, the representative household (VT) maximizes W by choosing his/her 
investment, consumption, and political effort, taking RP’s political effort and the tax 
rate as given, and anticipating the political contest constraint (8-2). Then, for the 
first-order conditions with respect to e and k, we have 
  '' e uG h =   a n d         ( 9 )  
  ' ' '[ '(1 ) 1] 0 Y uG f h f τ τ τ +− − = ,       ( 1 0 )  















From the optimizing behavior of voters, we obtain the response functions 
for e, k, and c. In general, e, k, and c are formulated as functions of τ  and a . 






M τ τ = , it is appropriate to separate the effect of  Y τ  on e from that of τ  on e. 
At  M τ τ = ,  Y τ  is fixed with respect to τ  in the first-order effect sense, such that 





  is the same between the two formulations. Then, we have 
(, ,) ee Y a τ τ = ,         ( 1 1 - 1 )  
(, ,) kk Y a τ τ = ,  and       (11-2) 
(, ,) cc Y a τ τ = .         ( 1 1 - 3 )  
With regard to the partial derivatives of equations (11-1, 2, 3) with respect 
to  τ , we have 
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, and A > 0 if the second-order condition is satisfied. Note that these 
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 (unless  1 = ′ f ). In addition, (12-2) reduces to 
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 at  M τ τ = ,  kτ  is negative at this point. Considering (12-2)', it 
follows that  '1 f > , and hence,  0 eτ <  at  that  point. 
  Note that the sign of  eτ   is generally ambiguous at  M τ τ ≠ . In other words, 
an increase in τ  normally reduces the disposable income, which is the negative 
income effect. On the other hand, an increase in τ  raises the total tax revenue if 
M τ τ < , which stimulates political effort e; this may be called the tax revenue effect. 
If the positive tax revenue effect dominates the negative income effect, an increase 
in  τ  would simulate political effort e. However, the total tax revenue effect is 
absent at the revenue-maximized point  M τ , and hence, an increase in τ  
undermines political effort e. 
 
3.3. Stage I 
Here, the rent-seeking RP maximizes S by choosing his/her political effort a and tax 
rate  τ , anticipating the political contest outcome (8-1) and VT’s response functions. 
The first-order condition with respect to a reduces to   11
2 () ( ) a ea e Y ae τ −= + .        ( 1 3 )  
The left-hand side of (13) represents the marginal benefit of increasing a and the 
right-hand side indicates the marginal cost of increasing a for RP. 







































at  M τ τ = , and hence, the first term of (14) 
reduces to zero at this point. On the other hand, since  0 e τ < , the second term of (14) 











  at RP’s optimal 
choice of  τ , which implies that the optimal level of  τ   set by RP is higher than  M τ . 
We can call this the Laffer paradox. 
 
3.4. Some remarks 
First, let us consider the case of n  > 1 and compare the cooperative and 
non-cooperative solutions. Suppose that VTs behave non-cooperatively in choosing e 
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by taking  i e−   as given. Then, the first-order condition with respect to  i e  gives  
'' e uG h = % ,         ( 9 ) '  








%  with  i e e =  for all i’s under the symmetric assumption.   
Note that Y = f(k) if n = 1 but Y = nf(k) if n > 1.   12
In the cooperative case where VTs maximize ∑ i W , the first-order 
condition becomes 
  '' e nu G h = % .         ( 9 ) "  
Since VTs internalize the spillover effect of each member’s political effort at the 
cooperative solution, the total marginal benefit of e is the sum of each member’s 
marginal benefit, which is expressed in the left-hand side of (9)". Comparing the two 
first-order conditions (9)' and (9)", it is clear that the equilibrium level of e (VT’s 
political effort) at the non-cooperative solution is less than that of the cooperative 
solution. 
Nevertheless, we can still show that in the non-cooperative case,  0 eτ <  at 
the revenue-maximizing point. This is because the first-order condition for each VT 
in the non-cooperative case is qualitatively the same as that in the cooperative case 
as long as  ∞ < n . If n goes to infinity, then the non-cooperative solution implies that 
e = 0 and the equilibrium reduces to the pure rent-seeking model of Section 2.2. 
Second, our seemingly paradoxical outcome holds in more general 
formulations of the political contest as long as τ  is set before VT determines e; 
therefore, an increase in τ  may reduce e at  M τ τ = . For example, consider the 
following setting, which is more general than (8-2): 


















It can be shown that the Laffer paradox still occurs under this formulation.   
 
4. Degree of rent seeking 
4.1. Analytical framework 
In the basic framework presented in Section 2, we follow the Weberian tradition and 
suppose that politicians are distinct from voters. 9 Specifically, it has been assumed 
that politicians adopt politics as a vocation and strive to make it their sole source of 
income. In this section, we relax this assumption. 
We now consider that politicians themselves are identical to voters, except 
that politicians use their political influence to seek rents once they are in power. 
Alternatively, to be elected or reelected, rent-seeking politicians must also pay 
attention to voter welfare. In any case, politicians may exhibit neither completely   13
self-interested nor completely benevolent behavior. 
Suppose that many types of politicians or governments exist. The types of 
governments or politicians may be represented by their degree of rent seeking, L. If 
the politicians are only concerned with rent seeking, as in the pure rent-seeking 
model developed in Section 2.2, the degree of rent seeking is the highest and it is 
normalized as unity. On the other hand, if the politicians are purely benevolent and 
seek to maximize the social welfare of voters, as in Section 2.3, rent seeking is 
absent and its degree is normalized as zero. 
In general, the degree of rent seeking, L, is given between 0 and 1. This 
formulation of 0 < L < 1 is an interesting combination of pure Leviathan and pure 
benevolent models. We allow politicians to choose a besides τ  and allow voters to 
choose e besides k. We consider L to be exogenously given in our model. It can be 
perceived that the actual L in a society emerges from the electoral systems or 
political institutions of the society; evidently, different resulting Ls reflect the 
different qualities of these systems and institutions. 
  Specifically, once a type of politician, L, is selected, the objective of RP,  Σ , 
is given as 
  (1 ) LS L W Σ≡ + − .        ( 1 5 )  
Keen (1995) and Edwards and Keen (1996) use a similar formulation. 
 
4.2. Analytical result 
Suppose that a type of politician, L, is exogenously given. The objective of RP,  Σ , is 
given as (15). Then, the effect of the tax rate on  Σ is  given  by 
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M τ τ =  yields 
  (' 1 ) cfk e τ ττ =− −   <   0 .        ( 2 0 )  
With  0 cτ < , the second term of (19) is negative. If the second term dominates the 
first term, an increase in τ  at a given level of  Y τ  would reduce Σ . In this case, 
the Laffer paradox does not occur. 















 at  M τ τ =  if and only if  LL > . In other 
words, the Laffer paradox will occur if  LL >  and not occur otherwise. Note that if 




  < 0 at  M τ τ =   must be true. It then follows that  01 L << . 
In this general version of the rent-seeking model, the Laffer paradox does 
not necessarily occur, since the paradoxical possibility also depends on the level of L. 
If the degree of a politician’s rent-seeking is higher, and his/her L is greater than  L, 
the Laffer paradox is more likely to occur, and vice versa. 
   
5. Concluding comments 
Pure benevolent governments impose a tax rate at a level lower than the 
revenue-maximizing tax rate. On the other hand, pure Leviathan-type governments 
impose taxes at the level that maximizes the tax revenue. It is now widely 
recognized that competition among governments can serve as an appropriate 
substitute for constitutional constraints on the power of politicians. 
Instead of institutional competition, we have examined the role of political 
protests as limits to Leviathans. More specifically, we consider a political contest 
model wherein self-interested politicians seek rents from public budgets, while 
general voters make political efforts to protest against politicians’ rent seeking 
directly (for example, through voting in referendums such as the passage of   15
Proposition 13) or indirectly (for example, through donating money to organized 
groups such as the National Taxpayer Union). It is shown that ironically, the Laffer 
paradox can occur in the political contest between rent-seeking politicians and 
general voters. Therefore, we provide an example where “voice” can increase, rather 
than decrease, the tax rate. 
We have explored the possibility that political protests may not limit the 
power of politicians. We do not claim that the Laffer paradox always occurs in a 
political contest model. If the degree of a politician rent seeking is low, the Laffer 
paradox is less likely to occur. Our model is admittedly highly stylized, and it 
abstracts from several possible complications in the real world. In particular, we 
focus on the conflict/contest between voters and politicians but ignore their 
heterogeneity. This excludes possible conflicts among voters (for example, various 
individuals or interest groups competing for budgets, as addressed in Becker, 1981) 
and among politicians themselves (for example, politicians pursuing their own 
career and personal interests and disagreeing over the distribution of budgets as 
revealed in Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). Nevertheless, we hope that this paper has 
highlighted the limitation of “voice” in constraining the power of politicians and 
served as a meaningful attempt toward attaining a relatively complete solution for 
containing Leviathans. 
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1. Tiebout (1956) and Hirschman (1970) are two classical works on the “exit” issue. 
2. For research on rent-seeking, see Congleton et al. (2008). 
3. See also Anderson et al. (1989). 
4. Proposition 13 endorsed by California voters to limit property tax burdens is a   16
renowned example. 
5. The National Taxpayer Union in the USA is “a nonprofit, nonpartisan citizen 
group whose members work every day for lower taxes and smaller government at all 
levels.” There are many other similar organized groups, including the California 
Taxpayers’ Association (“a watchdog group founded in 1926 to protect taxpayers 
from unnecessary taxes and to promote efficient, quality government services”) and 
World Taxpayers Associations (“working together for lower taxes, less waste, 
accountable government and taxpayer rights all over the world”). The quotations 
here appear in the websites of the respective organizations. 
6. See Nitzan (1994), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2006), and Konrad (2007) for 
surveys of relevant literature. 
7. This form of the contest success function is widely employed in studies on 
conflict/contest. See Konrad (2007, section 2.3) for its justifications. We discuss a 
more general formulation in Section 3.5. 
8. As noted by Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2006), this property is analytically 
convenient like the Cobb-Douglas form in the case of production functions in 
neoclassical economics, and this may be a reason for its popularity among 
applications. 
9. For a discussion on the Weberian tradition of modeling politicians, see Merlo 
(2006). 
   17
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